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Abstract 
 
Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most 
complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent 
years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly 
simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, 
with the added advantage that the methodology requires 
only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two 
aspects of variance filters: (i) the relationship established 
between market structure and price rigidity, and (ii) the 
use of different benchmarks for implementing the 
filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying 
a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized 
by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the 
positive relationship between monopolies and price 
rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-
competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is 
used. Our findings should serve to promote the 
implementation of this methodology among 
competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a 
more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Competition authorities pursue price-fixing conspiracies in three stages: detection, prosecution 
and penalization (Abrantes-Metz and Bajari, 2009). However, the detection of such a conspiracy 
or of some kind of price collusion is not always a straightforward task, even though leniency 
programs can enhance the effectiveness of competition policy in those countries that choose to 
adopt them (Borrell and Jiménez, 2008)1.  
 
However, one relatively simple way of analyzing the sectors is by "screening". Following 
Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2009), a screen comprises a statistical test that can identify those 
markets in which competition problems exist and, subsequently, which companies in that 
particular market are involved in a conspiracy. This mechanism can thus be used to conduct a 
preliminary analysis for identifying anomalous behavior in the markets.2 Once such behavior has 
been detected, a more exhaustive analysis can be carried out.3 
 
The methodology involves implementing two strategies: first, detecting events that appear 
improbable unless the companies in that industry have coordinated their actions; and second, 
monitoring a control group. Prices that appear anomalous when compared to those in other 
markets point to a problem of competition.4 
 
This article seeks to shed further light on these two strategies involved in applying the variance 
filter by drawing on empirical evidence for the retail gasoline market in the Canary Islands (Spain). 
This market has a number of notable characteristics. The first is that the retail gasoline market in 
Spain has been investigated by competition authorities several times.5 The second is that the 
Canary Island gasoline market is either a monopoly or an oligopoly depending on the island and 
this enables us first to test whether prices are more (or less) rigid in a monopolistic market, and 
                                                 
1 Although leniency programs can be effective in exposing collusive agreements, their effectiveness may depend on the 
type of agreement. The collusive agreements that are most difficult to detect are those in which companies stand to 
gain little from the leniency programs. 
2 The European Commission takes a two-step approach in its monitoring of markets. An initial structural approach 
involves scoring each market according to a range of indicators including the number of competitors and product 
homogeneity so as to estimate the likelihood of collusion. If a certain threshold is reached, then the market undergoes a 
second screening stage in which an empirical analysis is carried out. This approach seeks to minimize the resources 
employed and to maximize the likelihood that collusion will be detected. 
3 Chapter VIII of ABA (2010) provides a detailed discussion of the role of the economic expert in identifying a 
conspiracy. 
4 Price parallelism has been considered a collusive marker (Harrington, 2006a); even the US Department of Justice has 
suggested as much (Department of Justice, 2004). The two approaches have to satisfy the three criteria identified by 
Harrington (2006a): improbable events must be discernible by just looking at prices; the test should be routinizable; and 
the screen should be costly for the cartel to outmaneuver. 
5 In fact in 2010 the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (Spanish Competition Authority, CNC) published a report on 
retail gasoline competition in which it identifies several factors that affect the level of competition. The low number of 
independent retailers as a driver of competition is one of the cornerstones of this document. Moreover, majors and 
retailers have been investigated by the CNC, as in the case of Repsol/Cepsa/BP (Exp. 652/08). 
 4
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/20 pàg. 5 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/20  pag. 5 
 
 
second, to highlight the importance of finding a benchmark for comparison to make it easier to 
interpret the results. Finally, on some islands there are independent retailers that provide us with 
an additional competitive benchmark. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main theoretical and empirical literature 
examining the relationship between collusive agreements and price rigidity. Section 3 describes 
the data and characteristics of the market analyzed. Methodology and results are included in 
Section 4, while Section 5 discusses the interpretations of the empirical results using different 
benchmarks, leading to a final presentation of our conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Rigidity of prices: theoretical and empirical literature 
 
The literature on industrial organization has yet to provide a satisfactory theory linking price 
rigidity with collusion (Athey et al, 2004). Despite criticisms of this claim, most classic studies 
relate collusion positively with low price variability, as can be seen for example in the work of Mills 
(1927), Means (1935), Stigler (1961, 1964), Salop (1977), Fershtman (1982), Carlson and McAfee 
(1983) and Carlton (1986, 1989).6 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the most relevant work on collusion and price rigidity is that by 
Athey et al. (2004). They consider a model of collusion using an infinitely repeated Bertrand 
game, in which companies are privately informed as to their current cost positions. Assuming 
inelastic demand, they conclude (among other things) that if companies are sufficiently patient 
and the distribution of costs is log-concave, optimal symmetric collusion will be characterized by 
price rigidity and the absence of price wars on the equilibrium path. 
 
In another theoretical study, Harrington and Chen (2006) relate the existence of collusive 
agreements to price rigidity. They develop a dynamic computational model of cartel pricing with 
cost variability and endogenous buyer detection. They reported that, although prices are sensitive 
to cost in the latter phase, they are less volatile in collusive conduct than in competition path 
because it takes longer for cost shock to impact on price. 
 
                                                 
6 One approach is the dispersion of prices in markets with homogenous products (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Tsuruta, 
2008). Borenstein and Rose conclude that dispersion increases on routes with more competition or lower flight density. 
Although we do not use this approach, the positive relationship between the level of competition and price dispersion is 
in common with our methodology. 
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Genesove and Mullin (2001) review the rules and impact of the Sugar Institute, a cartel of 14 
companies including nearly all the sugar cane refining capacity in the United States (from 
December 1927 until it was ruled illegal in 1936). The cartel did not directly fix output or set prices 
but instead homogenized business practices, thereby making it easier to detect secret price cuts. 
The authors calculated the yearly margin on sugar refining in the United States in three stages: 
before, during and after the cartel period. Their most important finding was that the variance in 
this margin dropped by nearly 100% while the cartel remained active. Variance in margin is not 
the same as variance in price (although apparently costs were stable), but it should be considered 
an indicator of our objective. 
 
A further example is provided by Brannon (2003) for the retail gasoline market in the United 
States. The author believes that the introduction of "Wisconsin's Unfair Sales Act", which 
established a minimum market price to eliminate potential sales below cost, facilitated collusive 
agreements. The article calculates the average margin and the variance for two markets affected 
by this legislation, as well as a similar unaffected market, thereby enabling comparison. The 
results show that the average margin was actually higher in collusive markets. However, the 
findings as regards variance were not particularly conclusive. Despite this, the author shows there 
was a significant lack of price variation under the collusive agreement, so the paper lends support 
to the hypothesis that prices are more rigid under a collusive regime.  
 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) is another pioneering paper, in which the authors examine a case of 
bid-rigging and then, based on the results, undertake a study of possible collusion in a market. 
They find empirical evidence of higher prices and lower variance among cartel members in 
providing frozen fish to the US Army between 1984 and 1988. This cartel was detected and 
condemned by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice. The authors note how the 
collapse of the cartel led to a 16% fall in prices and a 263% increase in the standard deviation.  
 
With this empirical evidence the authors applied a variance filter to the retail gasoline market in 
Louisville to detect whether there were gas stations charging higher prices with lower standard 
deviations. They analyzed a large group of gas stations throughout the area and tested them 
together, benchmarking some against the others at the same moment in time. None of them, 
however, gave any indication of collusion and neither did any appear very different from the 
others (in terms of mean prices and standard deviations). The uniform behavior of the gas 
stations in this broad geographical area led the authors to consider competitive conduct a much 
more plausible explanation than the possibility that they were immersed in a collusive agreement. 
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Abrantes-Metz and Pereira (2007) analyzed the mobile phone sector in Portugal before and after 
the entry of a new operator (Optimus). They concluded that not only did prices fall but also that 
the coefficient of variation of all companies rose after this competitor entered the sector. 
 
Bolotova et al. (2008) employed extensions of the traditional (ARCH) and generalized (GARCH) 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models and reported some impact on average 
prices and variance, simultaneously, in the citric acid (1991-1995) and lysine (1992-1995) cartels. 
Their findings were mixed: price variance during the lysine conspiracy was lower whereas 
variance during the citric acid conspiracy was higher than it was during more competitive periods. 
However, the authors suggest that foreign competition might account for this outcome. Abrantes-
Metz et al. (2006) also argued that the unexpected increase in variance could have been due to 
the duration of the cartel or the shortage of post-collusion observations.  
 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2008) used a variance filter to analyze whether the LIBOR (an indicator 
used by banks to determine the profitability of venture capital) was being manipulated by collusive 
agreements, as reported by the Wall Street Journal. Although the variation in fees was very low 
and the vast majority of banks acted identically, the authors concluded that the low variance in the 
LIBOR quotes was consistent with a possible conspiracy, yet believed the impact on the overall 
LIBOR level might not have been material.7 
 
Detecting cartels using empirical data has always been a difficult task for antitrust agencies as a 
great amount of data is needed to determine whether the prices in a market area are above those 
of competitive level and, if so, why (Esposito and Ferrero, 2006). Therefore, statistical tools for 
detecting possible collusive behavior that require a low level of data can be useful, although they 
must be readily interpretable to be judged indicators of the existence of collusion.8 
 
A number of international competition authorities including the Federal Trade Commission (USA), 
CADE (Brazil), NMa (the Netherlands), BWB (Austria), the European Commission and the Italian 
Antitrust Authority have applied this methodology in their studies and in reaching decisions. 
Esposito and Ferrero (2006), for example, applied a variance filter to two cases previously 
considered by the Italian Antitrust Authority: the retail gasoline market on the one hand, and sales 
                                                 
7 See also Muthusamy et al. (2008), who analyze the behavior of potato prices in the market of Idaho. In this market 
measures were introduced to coordinate supply through the United Fresh Potato Growers of Idaho. Using the same 
methodology as Bolotova et al. (2008), they find statistically significant evidence suggesting that fresh potato price 
volatility is lower during the period when the cooperative is in the market as compared to the pre-cooperative period. 
8 Werden (2004) summarizes the economics behind collusion, its relationship with the law and its use in real cases, 
mainly in the United States. Indeed legal scholars and economists attach two different meanings to the word “collusion” 
- explicit collusion and tacit collusion (Buccirossi, 2006) - where the former denotes a specific antitrust infringement and 
the latter denotes a market outcome in which prices are above the competitive level, regardless of how this outcome 
was reached. Variance screening methods do not provide proof of explicit collusion. 
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of personal hygiene products and baby food in pharmacies on the other. They note that retail 
gasoline prices in Italy are the highest and the average standard deviation the lowest of all the 
EU-15 countries.  
 
For the second case study the authors compared the prices in pharmacies with those charged by 
supermarkets, which they considered as being a more competitive benchmark. As in the first 
case, the paper concludes that prices were higher and standard deviations lower in this market 
than in non-competitive companies. In short, the authors find that the variance filter reaches the 
same conclusions as those obtained by the competition authorities despite the fact that they 
applied different methodologies, i.e. there was a positive relationship between standard deviations 
of prices and competition. 
 
The relationship between behavior and collusive price rigidity, despite relatively clear indications 
of the same scenario (higher prices and lower standard deviations), is not unequivocal (see Table 
1 for a summary). Thus Brannon (2003) and Bolotova et al. (2008), for example, do not find a 
clear relationship.  
 
However, we also observe that these studies do not set a benchmark to compare the results 
obtained using the variance filter, and therefore any interpretation is hindered. It is also important 
to indicate that the belief that members of a cartel set prices significantly more rigidly incorporates 
the assumption that during the period of analysis there are no price wars. In our case the 
evolution of prices suggests that there are no price wars because there is no distinguishable 
period with greater price variation. 
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Table 1: Summary of empirical evidence on variance filters and the relationship 
between collusion and price rigidity  
Authors (Year) Sector Results 
Genesove and Mullin 
(2003) 
Sugar (USA) 
They do not analyze the variance in price, 
but the variance in margin falls nearly 100% 
during the cartel period. This should be a 
Brannon (2003) Retail gasoline market (USA) 
On introducing a Resale Price Maintenance 
Law in two cities, variance falls in one of 
them while the other remains unchanged. 
They use a different city as a benchmark. 
Abrantes-Metz et al 
(2006) 
Bid-rigging in frozen perch 
market (USA) 
Standard deviation increases by 263% after 
the cartel collapses. 
Abrantes-Metz et al 
(2006) 
Retail gasoline market (USA) No collusive behavior shown. 
Esposito and Ferrero 
(2006) 
Retail gasoline market (Italy) 
The standard deviations in the prices of 
gasoline in Italy are among the lowest in the 
EU-15.
Esposito and Ferrero 
(2006) 
Hygiene products and baby 
foods in pharmacies (Italy) 
The standard deviations in the prices of 
baby food are lower in pharmacies than in 
supermarkets.
Abrantes-Metz and 
Pereira (2007) 
Mobile phone sector 
(Portugal) 
After the entry of a new competitor, prices 
decrease and their coefficient of variation 
increases.
Bolotova et al (2008) Citric acid (USA) 
The use of ARCH and GARCH models 
shows that the variance is higher during the 
collusive period.
Bolotova et al (2008) Lysine (USA) 
The use of ARCH and GARCH models 
shows that the variance is lower during the 
collusive period
Muthusamy et al 
(2008) 
Potatoes (USA) 
The volatility of potato prices is lower during 
the cooperative period. 
Abrantes-Metz et al 
(2008) 
Financial indicator (USA) 
Although the variance is very low, the use 
of financial ratios and other benchmarks 
found no evidence of manipulation of 
Jiménez and 
Perdiguero (2011) 
Retail gasoline market (Spain) 
Only the comparison with the Canary Island 
market seems to indicate a non-competitive 
behavior. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
In summary, this methodology is easy to use and interpret and its use is widespread in both the 
academic literature and in practical applications. However, two aspects have yet to be analyzed in 
depth: the relationship between market structure and price rigidity, and the application of different 
benchmarks to interpret the results of the variance filter. The empirical implementation that follows 
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seeks to shed light on these two elements to assist in the interpretation and dissemination of this 
methodology. 
 
3. An example: the retail gasoline market in the Canary Islands (Spain) 
 
The gasoline market in the Canary Islands can be differentiated from others, including that 
operating in the rest of Spain. There are basically four differences: first, it has had greater 
experience in market liberalization compared to the rest of the country; second, most consumption 
is of local production (transformation), which reduces the level of imports; third, the market is 
characterized by a high concentration in all industrial processes.  
 
In the retail market, where the leading company is DISA, the concentration ratios for petrol 95 
(similar to diesel) are CR1=0.44 and CR3=0.70. Indeed Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009) used 
conjectural variation analysis to show that the oligopolistic islands have a level of competition 
closer to that of monopolistic behavior than Cournot competition. Notably, in the gasoline market 
in the Canary Islands there is only one independent company (PCAN) and there are no gas 
stations owned by supermarkets, as is often the case in the rest of Europe9.  
 
And fourth, the market comprises the seven islands in the archipelago. Five of these islands 
operate under oligopoly and in the other two there is a monopoly, all simultaneously and with 
equal taxation (for a more detailed description of the markets see Perdiguero and Jiménez, 2009).  
In the two islands under monopoly, DISA is the only firm operating and its behavior with respect to 
prices is mimetic of that of retailers on those islands. Gas stations located on the two islands 
under monopoly (La Gomera and El Hierro) set a uniform price every week, so there is no change 
in prices between different gas stations in each time period. However, this uniform price for all gas 
stations under monopoly changes every week, so the coefficient of variation is positive. 
 
In short, basic conditions on all the islands are similar as regards transport costs, wholesale 
behavior, taxes, etc. But each island differs from the others in terms of its geographical size and 
economic activities (see Table 2). In fact the monopolistic islands account for less than 2 per cent 
                                                 
9 In fact PCAN is not a single company but a group of independent retailers (Agrupación de Interés Económico under 
Spanish commercial law). As stated in the group's objectives, they formed this association “so as not to remain under 
the auspices of the majors”. These independent retailers act alone and run just 20 gas stations on all the oligopolistic 
islands. They act as a buying service, i.e. all the gas stations combine their orders to obtain better prices. They buy 
directly from the wholesalers and have no strict contractual relationship with them. The fact that PCAN is not vertically 
integrated means it can purchase from whichever wholesaler offers the best price. This can give it certain cost 
advantages over branded gas stations that are vertically integrated.  
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of the population, island tourism and total number of vehicles, while the average GDP per capita 
is 21% lower than the average of the five oligopolistic islands. 
Although the Canary Island gasoline market is highly vertically integrated, the variable under 
analysis should be the price set in each gas station. The reason for this is that a significant 
percentage of gas stations are vertically disintegrated, and within the vertically integrated gas 
stations the wholesaler fixes the price individually for each one taking into account local market 
characteristics (demand, costs, level of competition ... ) instead of setting uniform prices across 
the island. Therefore we analyze the prices at gas station level, but we refer to the islands where 
there is more than one wholesaler as "oligopoly". 
 
Table 2: Some data by island 
Island 
Population 
(2009) 
GDPpc (2007) Vehicles (2007) 
Tourists (IV 
quarter 2009) 
Gran Canaria 838,397 18,558 567,933 758,762 
Tenerife 899,833 18,169 655,765 816,087 
Lanzarote 141,938 21,119 121,151 366,801 
Fuerteventura 103,167 23,463 67,260 316,475 
La Palma 86,996 14,324 65,281 31,191 
La Gomera (monopoly) 22,769 16,104 13,380 19,977 
El Hierro (monopoly) 10,892 15,478 7,173 2,736 
Source: Canarian Institute of Statistics (ISTAC). GDPpc is expressed in nominal euros. Tourists are the number of 
tourists by island in the IV quarter of 2009. 
 
For this market we recorded prices for petrol 95 and diesel (the two products with the highest 
consumer demand) at all the island gas stations. The data are drawn from the website of the 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade (Government of Spain), where we obtained the price, 
expressed in euros per liter, on a weekly basis (every Wednesday). 
 
The database comprises a 24-week period from September 2008 to April 2009 and includes a 
total of 420 and 391 gas stations selling petrol 95 and diesel respectively. Several gas stations did 
not provide data for the whole sample period, but if we had excluded those with a notable number 
of missing values, we would have incurred a problem of sample bias. In this case 19% and 22% 
of the values for petrol 95 (10,080) and diesel (8,993) respectively were unavailable.10  
                                                 
10 Missing values were distributed quite evenly in terms of both distribution by firm (or by brand) and share of gas 
stations operated on each island, i.e. there were no critical data missing for one specific firm or one specific island. For 
example, by brand, CEPSA-DISA has 34% of the total market share and 28% of the missing values were for this brand. 
PCAN, with the smallest total market share, runs 6% of the islands’ gas stations while 2% of the missing values (both 
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However, as explained in Section 4, this potential bias was minimized using simulation techniques 
applying Monte Carlo Markov chains for the imputation of these missing values.  
 
Before implementing the imputation method, we determined whether the gas stations supplying 
less information might cause a problem of self-sampling, i.e. the companies providing less 
information (or of a worse quality in general) are those that behave "less competitively". Here the 
potential problem was apparently less important, given that the gas stations with missing values 
were almost identical to the sample of each company in the total population, for both types of 
product. Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics. 
                                                                                                                                                                
diesel and petrol 95) were for this brand. By island, Gran Canaria accounts for 31% of total gas stations in the 
archipelago and 23% of the missing values were for this island, and so on. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Average S.D. Min Max 
1st quadrant 0.229 0.421 0 1 
2nd quadrant 0.209 0.407 0 1 
3rd quadrant 0.178 0.383 0 1 
4th quadrant 0.384 0.487 0 1 
Average price Petrol 95 0.721 0.011 0.691 0.766 
Average CV Petrol 95 0.117 0.008 0.098 0.141 
Average price Diesel 0.667 0.010 0.637 0.719 
Average CV Diesel 0.171 0.008 0.146 0.193 
Angle degree 11.71 2.656 7.681 16.639 
Distance to average 0.016 0.008 0.00009 0.060 
No. rivals PCAN 0.108 0.338 0 2 
No. rivals not PCAN 0.447 0.723 0 4 
No. own brand 0.202 0.502 0 3 
Diesel 0.483 0.500 0 1 
% of rivals in the 4th quadrant 10.75 28.446 0 100 
BP 0.121 0.327 0 1 
Repsol 0.121 0.327 0 1 
Texaco 0.133 0.340 0 1 
PCAN 0.133 0.340 0 1 
DISA 0.492 0.501 0 1 
Shop 0.643 0.480 0 1 
Cafe 0.276 0.447 0 1 
Restaurant 0.061 0.240 0 1 
24 hours 0.196 0.398 0 1 
Car wash 0.421 0.494 0 1 
Garage 0.140 0.348 0 1 
Distance to highway 33.715 48.307 0.030 136.677 
Source: own elaboration compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. S.D. is standard 
deviation. 
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4. Empirical strategy and results  
 
Before implementing the variance filter, the first step involved “filling in” the missing data with 
predicted or simulated values. To do this we followed the possible solutions proposed by 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), namely mean substitution, simple hot-deck, regression and 
imputation methods. The aforementioned study favored imputation methods, specifically Gibbs 
sampling combined with the data augmentation method, which is a type of Markov chain Monte 
Carlo. 
In general, multiple imputations are drawn from a Bayesian predictive distribution: 
     , | | , |m o m o op z z p z z p z d     
where  is the data vector, oz zm  is the missing observations and   is the model parameters. The 
Gibbs sampling estimates the numerical approximation of ( ) | ozE g    , where g    is a 
function of interest as the mean or standard deviation of prices for a given subset of gas stations. 
In our case, we denoted  as the observed values and  as the missing values. The 
distribution of the unknown parameters 
otz zmt
  and  were then conditional on the known being 
the following predictive distribution: 
zmt oz
             0 0 0, | , , , , , |m o m mp z z p z z p z p z z p z p p z         
Specifically, the interpolation for the missing values uses the following first-order autoregressive 
model: 
zit  it  i zit1  i    it  
where  is the difference between the price for gas station i on day t minus the average daily 
price. Assuming 
zit
 itiid : N 0, i2  , the model permits a gas station to have prices that tend to be 
higher or lower than average by using i . 
Our unit of observation is the gas station, and the next step involved obtaining the average price 
and standard deviation for each gas station and, so as to avoid problems of scale, the coefficient 
of variation11 for the period studied.  
 
                                                 
11 The coefficient of variation is a dimensionless measure of dispersion that is the ratio between the standard deviation 
and the arithmetic mean. 
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Earlier articles adopting this methodology based on the use of standard deviation and a price 
comparison within a market include Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) and Bolotova et al. (2008). 
However, our analysis compared the performance of different markets that may have different 
costs and different demands, which means that the standard deviation could also be affected. For 
this reason we used the coefficient of variation in order to minimize this risk.  
 
Note also that we were not examining a previously denounced anti-competitive practice, so we 
knew neither the point at which the hypothetical cartel began its conduct nor when it had been 
terminated. The aim was to detect possible deviant behavior by individual gas stations or groups 
of gas stations throughout the period. Figure 1 shows the results for petrol 95 and diesel 
respectively. The horizontal and vertical lines show average prices and their coefficients of 
variation respectively for the entire sample. 
 
Figure 1: Price and coefficient of variation for petrol 95 and diesel (all gas stations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. 
Note: average prices are expressed in euros per liter of fuel. 
 
The graphs indicate that the results for petrol 95 and diesel were very similar, while the 
concentration of points is apparently denser in the center for diesel. The results were also similar 
for all the gas stations. In fact the results for perfect collusion and perfect competition are 
identical, which, as pointed out in the previous section, means that the findings are difficult to 
interpret. 
 
Although the parallel behavior of prices has been described as a collusive marker (see 
Harrington, 2006a and 2006b), in both the United States and the European Union it is not enough 
simply to discern the existence of collusive behavior. Indeed there is a vast body of literature 
describing the possibility of observing parallel prices without there being a collusive equilibrium 
(see Turner, 1962; MacLeod, 1985; Baker, 1993; and Buccirossi, 2006, among others). 
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Without a clear benchmark or a clearly demarcated period in which companies are known to have 
colluded, the results cannot be conclusive. Without such a comparative benchmark, the best we 
can do is identify those retailers located in quadrant IV, i.e. those with the highest prices and a 
below average coefficient of variation. 
 
This is precisely what is shown in Table 4, but with a slight nuance. Here we focus on the worst 
case scenario in competition analysis: gas stations with the highest prices and the lowest 
coefficients of variation by island (quadrant IV). Thus we obtained the gas station with the values 
farthest from the average. Table 4 shows the percentage change in maximum and minimum 
deviation with respect to each island’s average price. For example, the gas station on Gran 
Canaria charging the price farthest from the average fixed a price that was 1.86% above that 
average. 
 
Table 4: Maximum range of variation in quadrant IV, by island 
 
% Maximum highest price deviation with 
respect to average prices by island 
% Maximum lowest deviation with respect to 
the average coefficient of variation by island 
 Petrol 95 Diesel Petrol 95 Diesel 
Gran Canaria 1.86 8.40 -7.70 -8.83 
Tenerife 2.21 2.25 -13.08 -10.47 
Fuerteventura 4.18 1.28 -12.03 -7.26 
Lanzarote 1.52 5.86 -6.89 -5.90 
La Palma 2.38 1.79 -11.47 -4.32 
La Gomera (m) 0 0 0 0 
El Hierro (m) 0 0 0 0 
Source: own elaboration compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. (m) monopolistic 
island. 
 
It can be seen that the percentage differences in these extreme cases recorded in quadrant IV for 
each island do not even register an increase of more than 9%, nor more than 13% for the lowest 
coefficient of variation. In fact the variations are greater for the coefficients of variation than they 
are for the prices. 
 
Although no threshold has been set for determining collusion, Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) argue 
that it must at least be fixed as the average price plus or minus two standard deviations. Neither 
of these two conditions is met but, as pointed out by Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009), it should be 
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remembered that this market is characterized by low margins for large quantities, so this threshold 
may be different for gasoline markets.  
 
In short, by following this methodology and in the absence of a clear benchmark, we cannot 
conclude that a collusive agreement exists. This is in line with findings for the city of Louisville 
(USA) reported in Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006). 
 
5. Interpretation of results: a comparative analysis with different benchmarks 
 
In practice there are at least two screening approaches. The first involves monitoring price 
variance and assessing whether it is low relative to a benchmark. The second involves identifying 
the transition from non-collusion to collusion or vice versa. The latter approach includes a certain 
bias because the cartel's behavior before and after the collusive period will not be competitive, as 
we will show below. In our case we have no evidence that there was a formal cartel, so we will not 
follow this latter approach. 
 
The approach taken in this article is the former: monitoring the price variance and assessing 
whether it is low relative to a benchmark. Brannon (2003) took a city that had not been affected by 
legislative change. In our case, we can use at least two types of benchmark: 
 
i) If a monopoly exists 
 
The use of this benchmark enables us to change the perspective of the analysis shown in Figure 
1. In Figure 2 the horizontal and vertical lines show the average coefficient of variation and 
average price of the monopolistic islands respectively, thus reflecting the least competitive market 
structure. In this case we are looking for gas stations that have coefficients of variation similar to 
those of perfect collusion (monopoly). As we can see, the concentration of points for both 
products is close to the average coefficient of variation for the monopolistic islands. 
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Figure 2. Price and coefficient of variation for petrol 95 and diesel (all gas stations) using the 
monopolistic islands as the benchmark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. 
Note: average prices are expressed in euros per liter of fuel. 
 
Taking as our reference the behavior of the monopolistic islands, we can draw one important 
conclusion: gas stations in an oligopoly have a higher coefficient of variation. This means that we 
obtain evidence of a positive relationship between monopolistic behavior and price rigidity.  
 
The main advantage of this case is the existence of a real monopoly in two of the seven 
geographic markets analyzed, which in the literature (as far as we know) has never before been 
the case. In fact comparing monopolistic islands with oligopolistic markets is an ideal situation.  
All gas stations on the monopolistic islands show the same prices on both islands, but they are 
not the highest in all the markets. This reflects the vast difference in demand between these 
markets that we mentioned earlier. In fact Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009) examined the same 
market using a conjectural variation analysis emphasizing that the population was a statistically 
significant factor affecting the quantity sold and, indirectly, the price12. 
 
We can, however, draw a significant conclusion: the coefficient of variation of the companies on 
oligopolistic islands is always on average above those of the monopolistic islands. The 
percentage change in the coefficient of variation for each island with respect to that of the 
monopolistic islands is between 1.06% and 8% higher in the oligopolistic islands (t-test accept 
differences in mean between two groups, at 13-16% of probability, for petrol 95 and diesel 
respectively). In summary, monopolistic firms yield a more rigid price behavior than their 
oligopolistic counterparts. 
 
                                                 
12 A further explanation is the lower transport costs incurred by the monopolistic islands due to their greater proximity to 
the refinery in Tenerife. However, the little weight attributed to transport in total costs makes this unlikely. The possibility 
that there were significant differences in the demand elasticities does not seem to be the explanation. It is hard to 
imagine greater demand elasticity in monopoly than in oligopoly. 
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ii) If a very competitive company exists 
 
The question remains as to how best to analyze the situation if there is no monopoly to serve as a 
benchmark. One option is to identify companies that are known to be more competitive than the 
rest. This approach was adopted by Brannon (2003) and Esposito and Ferrero (2006) for their 
respective cases. In the retail gasoline market, Hastings (2004) and Clemenz and Gugler (2004) 
suggest that only independent firms increased competition in this market. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the Canary Islands there are no gas stations run by supermarkets (which 
traditionally compete more aggressively as regards pricing), but there is a company that operates 
in a similar way and which sells more cheaply, namely PCAN. As we mentioned in footnote 11, 
PCAN has both a lower value brand and fewer vertical restrictions with wholesalers than branded 
gas stations. 
 
Figure 3 uses the average price and coefficient of variation for PCAN gas stations in the Canary 
Islands as a benchmark. The objective is to find whether there are retailers in quadrant IV with 
higher prices and lower coefficients of variation. As can be seen, the vast majority of stations are 
located in this quadrant. 
 
Figure 3. Price and coefficient of variation for petrol 95 and diesel (all gas stations) using PCAN 
(independent) as the benchmark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. 
Note: average prices are expressed in euros per liter of fuel. 
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Likewise, most gas stations have higher prices and lower coefficients of variation when compared 
with the average figures recorded at PCAN’s pumps. Table 5 shows the average price and 
coefficient of variation percentages for each brand with respect to PCAN.13 
 
Table 5: Percentage variation in average prices and coefficients of variation for each brand with 
respect to PCAN (independent brand) 
 Petrol 95 Diesel 
Brand  Price (euros) 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Price (euros) 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Cepsa 1.1  -9.80  0.9  -5.89  
Disa 1.1  -13.06  1.5  -5.63  
Shell 1.3  -11.01  1.1  -7.70  
British Petroleum (BP) 1.7  -11.38  1.1  -6.04  
Repsol 1.1  -7.63  0.3  -5.33  
Texaco 1.8  -10.42  1.4  -4.66  
Others 1.5  -8.01  1.2  -4.52  
Total 1.3 -9.93 0.9 -5.89 
Source: own elaboration.  
 
The average prices of other brands are between 0.3% and 1.8% higher than PCAN's, while 
PCAN's average coefficient of variation is always between 4.5% and 13.1% greater than that of its 
competitors. A possible explanation for this price pattern could be the location of the gas stations 
belonging to each brand. However, as shown in Table 6, the distribution of pumps is very similar 
for all brands.14 
 
In fact PCAN, in common with the other brands, shows a preference for urban locations (see 
Table 6) and actually has more gas stations in towns than its competitors. For example, five 
PCAN gas stations (19% of its total) operate as a monopoly in their towns. Despite this advantage 
of being able to set higher prices, they remain the cheapest of all brands. 
                                                 
13 A t-test analysis shows that the average prices and coefficients of variation between PCAN gas stations and others 
are different. 
14 As seen in Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009), neither are there any significant differences in the number of 
complementary services (shops, restaurants, etc.) offered by the brands. 
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Table 6: Brands by population (percentage) 
Type of town Repsol Disa (*) Texaco BP PCAN 
Population < 2,000 3.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 7.7 
2,000<Pop<5,000 3.7 4.5 2.9 0.0 0.0 
5,000<Pop<10,000 11.1 10.7 14.7 10.7 15.4 
10,000<Pop<20,000 33.3 14.3 17.6 10.7 11.5 
20,000<Pop<30,000 0.0 13.4 11.8 10.7 19.2 
Pop > 30,000 48.1 55.4 52.9 67.9 46.2 
Source: own elaboration. (*) Disa is also CEPSA and Shell. 
 
In order to test whether PCAN stimulates competition, we adopted two empirical approaches. The 
first involved obtaining two values (those of prices and the coefficient of variation) for towns with 
and without PCAN gas stations. The results suggest that prices are always higher and the 
coefficient of variation smaller if PCAN is not present. Specifically, prices in towns with PCAN gas 
stations were 0.4% lower for petrol 95 and 0.3% lower for diesel, while the coefficients of variation 
were 2.2% and 0.6% higher respectively. In the case of petrol 95, both differences are statistically 
significant at 1%, while for diesel they are 5% for the price and 10% for the coefficient of variation. 
 
In the second approach we measured the influence of PCAN on the behavior of the other brands 
by estimating different models.  
 
The first approximation is a logit model. In this estimation the dependent variable takes a value of 
1 if the gas station is in the fourth quadrant (higher prices and lower coefficient of variation)15 
                                                 
15 This classification was carried out island by island and separately for gasoline and diesel. 
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compared to the number of PCAN rivals within a half-mile radius16, the number of rivals from other 
brands and the number of its own brand pumps.17 
 
We also included a set of control variables: first, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
observation belongs to diesel fuel and a value of zero in the case of petrol 95; second, the 
percentage of rivals that are in the fourth quadrant; third, a set of binary variables that reflected 
the effect of different brands; fourth, a set of binary variables that reflected whether the gas station 
offered a range of services (including shop, cafe, restaurant, 24-hour opening, car wash and 
garage services); and finally we calculated the distance from each gas station to the only 
motorway in Tenerife18. 
 
In the second approximation we construct a left hand side (LHS) variable that is the weighted 
average of average prices and coefficients of variation. This is expressed as: 
0( ) (1 )i i jAverageprice CV X ji i          
 
0( ) (1 )i j ji iAverageprice X CV i          
 
0 (1 )j i
i jiAverageprice X CVi
 
  

     
 
where “AveragePrice” is the average price and “CV” is the coefficient of variation of every gas 
station. “Xji” includes the same control variables as in the logit estimation. Using a nonlinear 
estimator we can estimate parameters 0 , ,  and .j    
The third approximation is similar to the previous one, but the LHS variables are the weighted 
average of distance of each average price and the coefficient of variation from the overall means 
                                                 
16 We believe that the “number of PCAN rivals within a half-mile radius” variable may be endogenous. 
Therefore we apply a two-stage approach. First we regress the number of PCAN rivals against the following 
variables: a binary variable with the characteristics of the nearest rival, a binary variable with the brand of 
the nearest rival, and a binary variable of the town and the population of the town where the gas station is 
located. However, the R2 of the first stage is very low, so the weakness of the instruments does not correct 
the endogeneity problem. It must be stressed that if the PCAN gas stations are located in places where the 
price was higher, the coefficient would be biased toward a minor value, so the real effect would be even 
greater. 
17 To perform this analysis we first georeferenced all gas stations operating on the seven islands and then 
calculated the minimum Euclidean distance between each. The Matlab codes used in these calculations are 
available from the authors on request. 
18 Table 7 shows that the number of observations is smaller than that for the whole sample. There are five 
explanations for this: 1) the islands of El Hierro, La Gomera and Gran Canaria have no PCAN gas stations 
and so were excluded from the sample; 2) not all the gas stations on the other islands were georeferenced 
as no correct coordinates were available; 3) not all the georeferenced gas stations provided information 
about their services; and 4) there is only one motorway (on the island of Tenerife), therefore the analysis 
that takes into account the distance to this highway only considers the gas stations on this island, 5) We 
exclude PCAN gas stations as they would be 0 in the variable "number of PCAN rivals”. 
 22
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/20 pàg. 23 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/20  pag. 23 
 
 
of the two variables, and the angle degree formed for each point to the spot formed by the overall 
means of the two variables. This expression is: 
0( ) (1 )i i jAngleDegree Dist X ji i        
i
 
 
0(1 ) i j ji iDist X AngleDegree          
 
0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
j i
i ji iDist X AngleDegree
 
        
                                                
 
 
where “Dist i” is the diagonal distance of each average price and coefficient of variation for each 
gas station i from the overall means of these two variables for the gas stations located in all four 
quadrants. In the first quadrant, the greater the distance the more competitive the behavior of the 
gas stations. However, this relationship is the opposite for those gas stations located in the fourth 
quadrant: the greater the distance the less competitive the behavior.  
 
To solve this problem we convert the distance in the fourth quadrant into negative values in such 
a way that the value of the variable distance is smaller as we move away from the mean. Because 
the interpretation of distance from the average and competitive behavior for the gas stations 
located in the second and third quadrants is hard,19 we remove these observations from our 
database . 20
 
The construction of the "AngleDegree" variable was complex too. Because gas stations are more 
competitive in the first quadrant, we set the diagonal of the first quadrant as angle zero. Therefore 
the diagonal of the fourth quadrant, the less competitive gas stations, remains at an angle of 180 
degrees. This means that as the angle decreases from 180 to 0 degrees, the behavior of the 
pump is more competitive (lower prices and higher coefficients of variation).  
 
However, the relationship above 180 degrees is the opposite. As the angle increases from 180 to 
360 degrees, this means that the behavior of the gas station is more competitive. To solve this 
problem we calculate the angle complementary to the gas stations located between 180 and 360 
degrees. Thus as the behavior of the gas stations becomes more competitive, the angle assigned 
to the pump is smaller.21 
 
19 In the second quadrant a higher distance means a higher price but a higher coefficient of variation too, and in the 
third quadrant it means a lower price but also a lower coefficient of variation. 
20 If instead of eliminating the observations we impose a value equal to 0 for the gas stations located in the third and 
fourth quadrants, the conclusions do not change significantly. 
21 We made another specification “in the spirit of” Tobit analysis, where the endogenous variable is a weighted average 
between these two variables for the gas stations located in the fourth quadrant and 0 for the rest. The results are not 
provided here because they do not change significantly. 
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As in the previous approximation, by using a nonlinear estimator we can estimate parameters 
0 ,  and .j    
Finally we apply a multinomial logit, where the endogenous variable takes the value of the 
quadrant where the gas station is located.  
 
The econometric results of the first three approximations can be seen in Table 7 and the result of 
the multinomial logit can be seen in Table 8 22 . 23
                                                 
22 In order to de-trend the data and as a robustness check, we have applied a new coefficient of variation by using 
standard errors from OLS regressions of prices against a time trend for each gas station. Then we repeat this using 
graphs and estimations and conclude that the results are not appreciably different. 
23 A Chow test has been implemented to test whether petrol 95 and diesel have to be estimated pooled or separately. In 
all cases the Chow test shows that at 10% we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of petrol 95 and 
diesel are the same. Therefore the estimation can be made by pooling. 
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Table 7: Econometric results 
 First approximation Second approximation Third approximation 
Constant 0.015 
(0.189) 
0.354 
(0.234) 
0.194 
(0.333) 
0.864*** 
(0.099) 
0.821*** 
(0.094) 
0.779*** 
(0.088) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
No. rivals 
PCAN 
-0.579* 
(0.307) 
-0.746** 
(0.326) 
-0.598* 
(0.358) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
No. rivals not 
PCAN 
0.143 
(0.157) 
0.097 
(0.160) 
-0.051 
(0.191) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.00002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.00004 
(0.0006) 
No. own brand -0.352 
(0.221) 
-0.219 
(0.227) 
0.151 
(0.340) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Diesel 0.166 
(0.209) 
0.149 
(0.217) 
0.442 
(0.270) 
-0.053*** 
(0.001) 
-0.054*** 
(0.001) 
-0.053*** 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
% 4th quadrant 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00005*** 
(0.00002) 
4.82e-06 
(0.0002) 
0.00003 
(0.00003) 
0.00003 
(0.00003) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
BP -0.045 
(0.321) 
-0.019 
(0.343) 
-0.309 
(0.439) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Repsol -0.848** 
(0.339) 
-0.525 
(0.426) 
-0.117 
(0.577) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.0037 
(0.0024) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Texaco -0.050 
(0.294) 
0.084 
(0.321) 
-0.401 
(0.371) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0018) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Shop  -0.345 
(0.251) 
-0.145 
(0.346) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
 0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Cafe  0.088 
(0.361) 
-0.547 
(0.433) 
 -0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Restaurant  -0.165 
(0.515) 
-0.104 
(0.555) 
 -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
 -0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
24 hours  0.049 
(0.304) 
0.020 
(0.374) 
 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Car wash  -0.079 
(0.284) 
0.045 
(0.378) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
 0.00002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Garage  -1.167*** 
(0.424) 
-1.110* 
(0.591) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Distance to 
highway 
  0.126* 
(0.065) 
  0.0001 
(0.0001) 
  -1.72e-07 
(1.02e-07)      1.169*** 
(0.118) 
1.116*** 
(0.094) 
1.072*** 
(0.106) 
-0.0002*** 
(8.53e-06) 
-0.0002*** 
(9.17e-06) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00001) 
No. Obs. 392 377 260 392 377 260 232 222 158 
Wald Chi2 19.41** 
(0.0128) 
27.96** 
(0.0144) 
27.64** 
(0.0239) 
      
(Pseudo for 
first 
approximation) 
R2 
0.0370 0.0603 0.0904 0.8954 0.9023 0.9456 0.6107 0.6063 0.6574 
Note: robust standard error in brackets. *** (1%), ** (5%), * (!0%). 
 25
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                            Document de Treball   2011/20 pàg. 26 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                             Working Paper            2011/20  pag. 26 
 
 
 
Table 8: Econometric results of multinomial logit. 
 F.Q. S.Q. T.Q. F.Q. S.Q. T.Q. F.Q. S.Q. T.Q. 
Constant -0.729*** 
(0.261) 
-0.632*** 
(0.239) 
-1.074*** 
(0.281) 
-1.026*** 
(0.347) 
-0.320 
(0.281) 
-1.472*** 
(0.374) 
-0.537 
(0.463) 
-0.377 
(0.369) 
-1.805*** 
(0.548) 
No. rivals 
PCAN 
1.280*** 
(0.387) 
0.203 
(0.441) 
0.693 
(0.443) 
1.614*** 
(0.430) 
0.271 
(0.463) 
0.927** 
(0.446) 
1.266** 
(0.544) 
0.222 
(0.523) 
1.377*** 
(0.521) 
No. rivals 
not PCAN 
-0.408* 
(0.235) 
0.049 
(0.192) 
-0.280 
(0.270) 
-0.389 
(0.250) 
0.109 
(0.203) 
-0.138 
(0.274) 
-0.210 
(0.268) 
0.137 
(0.228) 
0.271 
(0.321) 
No. own 
brand 
0.278 
(0.279) 
-0.592* 
(0.321) 
0.717** 
(0.292) 
-0.010 
(0.305) 
-0.444 
(0.358) 
0.687** 
(0.315) 
-1.000* 
(0.609) 
-0.336 
(0.433) 
-0.541 
(0.447) 
Diesel -0.224 
(0.314) 
0.216 
(0.265) 
0.082 
(0.304) 
-0.181 
(0.325) 
0.276 
(0.276) 
0.156 
(0.317) 
-0.226 
(0.427) 
0.156 
(0.319) 
-0.164 
(0.417) 
% 4th 
quadrant 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.501 
(0.450) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
BP -0.650 
(0.501) 
0.082 
(0.371) 
-1.588*** 
(0.602) 
-0.178 
(0.565) 
0.147 
(0.417) 
-1.812** 
(0.699) 
-0.849 
(0.783) 
-0.055 
(0.496) 
-2.888* 
(1.616) 
Repsol -0.284 
(0.465) 
-0.893 
(0.591) 
0.974*** 
(0.371) 
-0.011 
(0.626) 
-1.369** 
(0.689) 
0.634 
(0.535) 
-1.215 
(1.013) 
-0.650 
(0.845) 
1.550** 
(0.777) 
Texaco -1.156** 
(0.530) 
-0.176 
(0.351) 
-0.769 
(0.471) 
-1.107** 
(0.549) 
-0.218 
(0.368) 
-1.195** 
(0.516) 
-0.553 
(0.542) 
-0.273 
(0.460) 
-0.722 
(0.643) 
Shop    -0.473 
(0.370) 
-0.490 
(0.346) 
0.062 
(0.375) 
0.006 
(0.527) 
-0.501 
(0.450) 
-0.112 
(0.537) 
Cafe    0.222 
(0.527) 
-0.013 
(0.465) 
-0.021 
(0.490) 
0.300 
(0.602) 
-0.450 
(0.517) 
0.116 
(0.645) 
Restaurant    -0.582 
(0.979) 
0.358 
(0.651) 
1.171* 
(0.653) 
-0.269 
(1.060) 
0.689 
(0.689) 
2.089** 
(0.861) 
24 hours    0.181 
(0.429) 
-0.562 
(0.438) 
-0.048 
(0.450) 
-0.403 
(0.553) 
-0.383 
(0.473) 
-0.110 
(0.619) 
Car wash    0.661 
(0.401) 
-0.288 
(0.387) 
0.292 
(0.414) 
0.370 
(0.568) 
-0.096 
(0.449) 
0.724 
(0.608) 
Garage    0.294 
(0.692) 
0.656 
(0.529) 
1.434*** 
(0.511) 
0.280 
(0.918) 
1.074 
(0.688) 
0.675 
(0.740) 
Distance to 
highway 
      -0.310*** 
(0.111) 
-0.001 
(0.051) 
-0.004 
(0.095) 
No. Obs. 
Wald Chi2 
 
Pseudo R2 
392 
77.61*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0732 
377 
110.39*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1104 
260 
83.72*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1195 
Note: robust standard error in brackets. *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
F.Q.= first quadrant; S.Q.= second quadrant; T.Q.= third quadrant. 
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It can be seen that the variable number of PCAN rivals located within a half-mile radius is 
consistently significant. In the first and second approximations the econometric result indicates 
that the presence of an independent gas station has a negative impact on the likelihood of higher 
pricing and a more rigid pricing structure, which is consistent with less competitive behavior.  
 
Therefore there would seem to be a correlation between the presence of a PCAN gas station and 
higher competition (lower prices). In the third approximation the impact of PCAN rivals is positive 
and significant at 1%. As   is negative in this case, the relationship between PCAN rivals and 
competitive behavior is the same. A higher number of PCAN rivals increases the distance and 
reduces the angle degree, so this has a positive impact on the competitive behavior of the gas 
stations. 
 
In the fourth approximation, the multinomial logit model, the econometric results show the same 
conclusion. The presence of PCAN rivals increases the probability of moving from the fourth to 
the first quadrant, so the presence of PCAN rivals increases the probability of more competitive 
prices. It is true that PCAN rivals also increase the probability of passing from the fourth to the 
third quadrant, but with less intensity.  
 
With these results we can conclude that the presence of an independent retailer within a half-mile 
radius is correlated to lower and more flexible gasoline prices. 
 
There are a number of issues to discuss regarding the control variables. First, the variable that 
shows the percentage of competitors in the fourth quadrant is positive and significant in two of the 
estimations. This result indicates that there might be some geographical "clumping", although it 
would be mild24. Therefore it is unlikely that there is a formal collusive agreement, but the
presence of PCAN in the market significantly increases the level of competition, resulting in lower 
and more flexible prices.
       
  
25  
 
Second, the variables that cover the services offered by gas stations and the distance to the 
highway do not seem to have a significant effect on price behavior. 
                                                 
24 We calculate the percentage of gas stations in a half-mile radius of each point of sale located in the fourth 
quadrant. The statistical results show that the gas stations located in the fourth quadrant have a higher 
percentage of gas stations in a half-mile radius also located in the fourth quadrant. Specifically, gas stations 
located in the fourth quadrant have 19.37% of gas stations in a half-mile radius also in the fourth quadrant, 
whereas gas stations not located in the fourth quadrant have only 7.78% of gas stations in a half-mile radius 
located in the fourth quadrant. 
25 This result is similar to the entry effects of Wal-Mart on prices. This has been studied in several papers, 
which conclude that prices decline after its entry. See for example Basker (2005), Basker and Noel (2009) 
and Lira et al (2007) for the Chilean market. 
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Summary of results 
Analyzing the results of the variance filter without comparing them to a benchmark did not enable 
us to draw any definitive conclusions. However, applying the two types of benchmark mentioned 
above yielded the following conclusion: most of the gas stations present behavior that is very 
close to being monopolistic and are clearly less competitive than the independent company, 
PCAN. 
 
Although the coefficient of variation for gas stations operating in oligopolies is higher than for their 
counterparts in a monopolistic situation and lower than PCAN's, the conduct of the gas stations is 
closer to the former than to the latter. We can therefore conclude that the average performance of 
the gas stations (excluding those run by PCAN) is very close to that shown on a monopolistic 
island.  
 
This evidence would certainly justify further investigation of their behavior by the competition 
authorities. As we have stressed, the variance filter is a suitable technique for detecting possible 
cartels and for selecting markets for further analysis (i.e. structural analyses that can take into 
account demand functions, costs, etc.). 
 
This result is not surprising if we take into account the characteristics of the gasoline market in the 
Canary Islands and the empirical evidence presented above. Moreover, this retail market 
conforms to most of the factors that facilitate tacit collusion as described by Ivaldi et al. (2003) and 
the ABA (2010): namely symmetrical costs, transparency of information, etc.  
 
Furthermore, this market also conforms to some of the factors that give rise to price rigidity. For 
example, Athey et al. (2004) confirm that price rigidity can arise if companies know their rivals’ 
costs. In this case all companies share the same wholesaler. 
 
Genesove and Mullin (2001) suggest market transparency as a way of controlling price variability, 
and this gasoline market is certainly highly transparent. Connor (2005) argues that preventing or 
limiting entry increases the likelihood that price variation will be reduced. Without actually 
accusing the companies here of forming part of a cartel, entry might be low in this sector either for 
environmental reasons or because of the difficulty in obtaining licenses to open gas stations in 
new areas, especially with the current stagnation in demand, even at high fixed (and sunk) costs. 
 
Empirical evidence obtained by adopting other approaches also supports a conclusion of non-
competitive behavior. The results obtained by Jiménez and Perdiguero (2008) and Perdiguero 
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and Jiménez (2009) using conjectural variation analyses show that the typical behavior of gas 
stations operating in oligopolistic markets is close to perfect collusion. Indeed the authors cannot 
rule out the possibility that retailers behave as a monopoly. 
 
Thus, while the aggregate analysis carried out here does not allow us to conclude that collusive 
behavior exists, the application of two benchmarks (a monopoly island and a company with a 
more aggressive attitude to price competition) together with the results of other structural 
approaches to this sector allow us to conclude that the retail gasoline market could be more 
competitive than it currently is, and, while no companies exercise effective competition (such as 
PCAN), the implicit behavior of the firms is more pro-collusive than pro-competitive. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
The detection, analysis and prosecution of cartels are the competition authorities’ main tasks. 
However, detecting cartels is by no means straightforward. Therefore the development of simple 
methods requiring only a relatively low level of data for identifying possible collusive behavior can 
be of great use.  
 
The variance filter satisfies these requirements and has therefore become popular in recent years. 
However, despite its popularity, two aspects have remained undiscussed to date, namely the 
existence of the relationship between market structure and price rigidity, and the implementation 
of different types of benchmark for interpreting results.  
 
This article has sought to shed light on these issues by applying a variance filter to the retail 
gasoline market in the Canary Islands (Spain). The islands are unusual in that the market on five 
of them is in the form of an oligopoly while that on the remaining two is monopolized by the DISA 
company. This particular market structure has enabled us to determine whether monopoly prices 
were more or less rigid in comparison with a potentially more competitive market and thus draw 
conclusions about the level of competition. 
 
Our empirical results have shown, firstly, how the retailers on monopolistic islands presented 
lower coefficients of variation than those on other islands, thereby confirming that lower 
competition in markets tends to lower price variability. Secondly, the comparison of results 
obtained for the monopoly in gas stations and for the independent company (PCAN) suggests that 
the situation recorded is closer to perfect collusion than to a competitive outcome. Jiménez and 
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Perdiguero (2008) and Perdiguero and Jiménez (2009) report similar conclusions, albeit by 
applying different methodologies. 
 
The appropriateness of such tools as collusive markers should be stressed. The empirical 
evidence presented here should serve to consolidate methodologies that confirm the existence of 
more rigid prices in the presence of a cartel and make it easier to interpret results using different 
benchmarks. 
 
Note, however, that it is important to correctly define the benchmark of comparison when adopting 
this method so as to ensure a truly practical way for the competition authorities to operate. In this 
particular instance we have used monopolies, but when this is not possible and there is no known 
period of collusion, we have seen that the behavior of independent gas stations could serve as a 
reference.  
 
As the ABA (2010) explains, although in theory it might seem that parallel pricing (and other 
parallel practices) might merely reflect independent behavior determined by expectations of the 
way in which competitors will respond, the law has developed to where the burden is on the 
plaintiff to identify any possible “plus factors”, i.e. additional evidence or indicators of coordinated 
action.  
 
However, the ABA goes on to state that: “(…) when sellers recognize their interdependence and 
compete during a number of time periods, their interactions may evolve from non-cooperative 
oligopoly into tacit collusion without communication of an explicit agreement”. This would appear 
to be the case in the situation we have described here. 
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